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Background	  	  The	  2014	  Track	  II	  U.S.-­‐Russia	  Dialogue,	  “21st	  Century	  Strategic	  Stability,”	  was	  held	  in	  Monterey,	  California,	  from	  May	  23-­‐24,	  2014.	  This	  dialogue	  was	  formally	  unofficial,	  but	  many	   participants	   have	   had	   experience	   in	   or	   connections	   to	   government.	   The	   event	  brought	   together	   U.S.	   and	   Russian	   experts	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   two	   countries’	  perspectives,	   both	   conceptually	   and	   operationally,	   on	   regional	   trends	   impacting	  strategic	  stability,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  foundations	  of	  strategic	  stability	  itself.	   The	   goal	   of	   the	   dialogue	   was	   to	   identify	   important	   elements	   of	   each	   side’s	  strategic	  outlook;	  highlight	  potential	  areas	  of	  cooperation;	  and	  identify	  possible	  means	  of	   overcoming	   problems	   in	   the	   U.S.-­‐Russia	   relationship.	   If	  we	   needed	   an	   example	   of	  how	  a	  regional	  crisis	  can	  unexpectedly	  affect	  strategic	  stability,	  the	  dialogue	  could	  not	  have	  been	  more	  timely,	  as	  it	  took	  place	  amidst	  the	  crisis	  over	  Ukraine.	  	  The	   dialogue	   was	   organized	   by	   the	   Naval	   Postgraduate	   School’s	   (NPS)	   Center	   on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  and	  was	  funded	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency’s	  (DTRA)	  Project	  on	  Advanced	  Systems	  and	  Concepts	  for	  Countering	  WMD	  (PASCC).	  The	  following	   pages	   review	   the	   proceedings	   of	   this	  meeting	   and	   provide	   analysis	   on	   the	  panel	  presentations	  and	  ensuing	  discussions.	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Executive	  Summary	  	  The	   opportunities	   for	   cooperation	   in	   strengthening	   strategic	   stability	   between	   the	  United	   States	   and	   Russia	   have	   been	   greatly	   reduced	   by	   the	   deterioration	   of	   the	  relations	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   as	   well	   as	   by	   their	   different	   views	   of	   strategic	  stability	  in	  bilateral	  relations	  and	  in	  several	  key	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  situation	  has	  been	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  Kremlin’s	  belief	  that	  the	  United	  States’	  primary	  goal	  is	  regime	  change	  in	  Russia,	  and	  by	  the	  politicization	  of	  expert,	  media,	  and	  official	  analysis	  in	   Russia.	   Russia	   considers	   practically	   all	   U.S.	   policies	   (e.g.,	   missile	   defense,	  conventional	  Prompt	  Global	  Strike,	  democracy	  promotion,	  use	  of	  military	  force	  in	  the	  Middle	  East)	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  strategic	  stability.	  Russia	  views	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  competition	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Russia	  has	  relatively	  little	   interest	   in	   strengthening	   strategic	   stability	   in	   the	   China-­‐India-­‐Pakistan	  relationship,	   being	   more	   preoccupied	   with	   protecting	   Central	   Asia	   from	   Islamist	  fighters.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   China,	   there	   are	   chances	   for	   a	   discrete	   dialogue	   between	  Russia	   and	   the	   United	   States,	   if	   and	   when	   the	   relations	   between	   Washington	   and	  Moscow	   improve.	   In	   the	  current	  situation,	  nuclear	  arms	  control	  negotiations,	  both	  at	  the	   strategic	   and	   non-­‐strategic	   levels,	   have	   little	   chance	   of	   success.	   If	   the	   Russian	  economy	  continues	  to	  slow	  down,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Russia	  may	  consider	  further	  U.S.-­‐	  Russian	  bilateral	  reductions	  of	  strategic	  nuclear	  weapons.	  In	  the	  meanwhile,	  unofficial	  contacts	  (Track	  II)	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Russian	  experts	  should	  be	  maintained	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  our	  competing	  visions	  of	  doctrine	  and	  capabilities	  might	  play	  out	  in	  a	  confrontation	  or	  crisis	  where	  the	  use	  of	  force	  is	  a	  real	  possibility.	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1.	  Overview	  of	  Political	  and	  Technological	  Trends	  and	  Implications	  
for	  U.S.-­‐Russian	  Relations	  	  Opening	  the	  dialogue,	  one	  American	  participant	  observed	  that	  the	  Russian	  annexation	  of	   the	   Crimea	   and	   subsequent	   support	   for	   separatists	   in	   Eastern	   Ukraine	   have	  “fundamentally	  altered	  the	  U.S.	  view	  of	  Russia	  throughout	  the	  government,”	  and	  that	  it	  would	  “take	  years	   for	  [the	  U.S.	  and	  Russia]	   to	   find	  the	  right	  model	  of	   interaction	  that	  lets	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	  move	   forward	  without	   implying	   a	   legitimization	   of	   the	  Crimea	   annexation.”	   The	   deterioration	   of	   the	   official	   relationship,	   observed	   the	  speaker,	  makes	  Track	   II	  discussions	  even	  more	   important,	   and	   “forces	  us	   to	   think	   in	  long-­‐range	  terms.”	  He	  listed	  the	  three	  political	  trends	  that	  will	  play	  key	  roles	  in	  future	  attempts	   to	   achieve	   strategic	   stability:	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   U.S.	   –	   Russian	   “reset,”	   the	  fading	   of	   the	   vision	  President	  Obama	   set	   forth	   in	  Prague	  of	   a	  world	  without	  nuclear	  weapons,	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   China	   as	   a	   significant	   player	   in	   global	   affairs	   and	   a	  complicating	   factor	   in	   relations	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Russia.	   The	   speaker	  noted	   that	   absent	   the	   vision	   of	   a	   nuclear-­‐free	   world,	   and	   with	   Russia	   proclaiming	  American	  missile	  defense	  as	  the	  obstacle	  to	  any	  further	  strategic	  arms	  reductions,	  the	  reason	  for	  new	  strategic	  arms	  control	  and	  reduction	  talks	  has	  disappeared;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  the	  speaker’s	  opinion,	  neither	  Russia	  nor	  the	  Unites	  States	  wants	  New	  START	  to	  expire	  in	  2020	  without	  being	  replaced	  by	  a	  follow-­‐on	  arms	  control	  framework.	  The	   most	   important	   technological	   trend	   of	   the	   future	   will	   be	   the	   proliferation	   of	  weapons	  that	  can	  have	  a	  strategic	  impact.	  According	  to	  an	  American	  speaker,	  there	  are	  two	  primary	  elements	  of	  Russian	  policy	   that	  would	  make	   it	  difficult	   to	   find	   common	  ground	  regarding	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  new	  capabilities	  for	  strategic	  stability.	  One	  factor	  is	  the	  2010	  Russian	  Military	  Doctrine,	  which	  designates	  the	  U.S.	  and	  NATO	  as	  the	  main	   threats	   to	  Russia	  and	  suggests	  reliance	  on	  nuclear	  use	   for	  de-­‐escalation,	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  American	  speaker,	  could	  potentially	  lead	  to	  escalation	  rather	  than	  de-­‐escalation	   during	   a	   crisis.	   The	   second	   factor	   is	   the	   Russian	   perception	   of	   the	  “increasing	  U.S.	  reliance	  on	  precision	  strike	  and	  ballistic	  missile	  defense.”	  While	  these	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trends	   have	   not	   been	   driven	   by	   U.S.	   offensive	   intentions	   against	   about	   Russia,	   the	  Russians	  view	  these	  systems	  as	  directed	  against	  them.	  	  A	  Russian	  participant	   remarked	  upon	   several	  paradoxes	   and	   inconsistencies	   in	   arms	  control	  agreements	  and	   the	  American	  approach	   to	  strategic	  stability.	   In	  his	  view,	   the	  American	  attitude	  to	  strategic	  stability	  changes	  too	  quickly—only	  a	  few	  years	  ago	  the	  United	   States	   was	   not	   interested	   in	   discussing	   strategic	   stability,	   but	   now	   it	   is	   in	  fashion	  again.	   It	   is	  difficult	   to	  measure	   strategic	   stability	   in	   any	  precise	  way	  because	  strategic	   stability	   involves	   a	   complex	   interplay	   of	   nuclear	   and	   non-­‐nuclear	  weapons	  including:	  precision-­‐guided	  munitions	  (PGMs);	  offensive	  and	  defensive	  weapons,	  such	  as	   ballistic	   missile	   defense;	   strategic	   and	   non-­‐strategic	   nuclear	   weapons;	   and	   latent	  weapons	   that	   are	   not	   yet	   deployed	   and	  may	   not	   exist	   except	   on	   paper.	   The	  Russian	  speaker	   also	   suggested	   that	   we	   consider	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   “strategic	   shock”	   –	   an	  unanticipated	   change	   in	   the	   geopolitical	   situation	   (like	   the	   crisis	   in	   Ukraine)	   –	   that	  could	   upend	   existing	   perceptions	   of	   strategic	   stability.	   He	   gave	   several	   examples	   of	  paradoxes	  one	  finds	  in	  today’s	  arms	  control:	  	  
• Long-­‐range	   PGMs	   are	   ICBMs	   with	   conventional	   warheads.	   Should	   we	   count	  these	  PGMs	  as	  strategic	  weapons	  even	  though	  the	  current	  strategic	  arms	  control	  treaty	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  parties	  from	  substituting	  conventional	  warheads	  in	  place	  of	  nuclear	  warheads	  on	  ICBMs?	  What	  would	  be	  the	  equivalence	  between	  ICBMs	  armed	  with	  conventional	  versus	  nuclear	  warheads?	  
• Conventionally	   armed	   cruise	   missiles	   can	   deliver	   precision	   strikes	   against	  Russian	   strategic	   forces,	   but	   they	   are	   not	   included	   in	   strategic	   arms	   control	  treaties.	  	  There	  are	  also	  subjective	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Russian	  leadership	  to	  BMD	  systems	   that	   are	   neither	   nuclear	   nor,	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   strategic	   in	   nature.	  Nevertheless,	   according	   to	   the	   Russian	   panelist,	   “Putin	   and	   others	   views	   these	  weapons	  as	  dangerous	  and	  refuse	  to	  buy	  technical	  arguments	  that	  these	  weapons	  are	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not	   a	   threat.”	   He	   suggested	   that	   the	   closer	   these	   BMD	   systems	   are	   to	   the	   Russian	  border,	  the	  more	  dangerous	  the	  Kremlin	  perceives	  them	  to	  be.	  	  In	   conclusion,	   the	  Russian	   speaker	   said	   that	   “we	   cannot	   live	  without	   each	  other	   and	  without	  arms	  control,”	  and	  suggested	  that	  Russia	  would	  soon	  be	  disappointed	  with	  its	  relationship	  with	  China	  and	  return	  to	  the	  emphasis	  on	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  One	  American	  speaker	  remarked	  that	  the	  context	  of	  strategic	  stability	  in	  Europe	  would	  depend	  on	  U.S.-­‐Russian	  relations.	   In	   the	  recent	  past,	   the	  relationship	  had	   its	  ups	  and	  downs:	  the	  successes	  of	  1993	  were	  limited	  by	  problems	  over	  BMD	  and	  Kosovo,	  only	  to	  recover	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	  George	  W.	  Bush	  and	  Vladimir	  Putin	  presidencies,	   then	   to	  take	   a	   tumble	  over	  Georgia,	   recover	   somewhat	  during	   the	   “reset”	   of	  2009-­‐2011,	   and	  then	   to	   take	   another	   plunge	   beginning	   in	   2011.	   How	   can	   this	   relationship	   be	  made	  more	  sustainable	  and	  predictable?	  	  Here	  the	  discussion	  inevitably	  turned	  to	  the	  crisis	  in	  and	  around	  Ukraine.	  One	  Russian	  participant	  observed	  that	  it	  would	  be	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  resolve	  this	  crisis	  because	  it	  is	  rooted	  in	  Putin’s	  domestic	  politics:	  his	  political	  strength	  relies	  on	  nationalism,	  and	  he	  whips	  up	  nationalist	  fervor	  by	  creating	  an	  image	  of	  Russia	  surrounded	  by	  enemies.	  He	  drew	  a	  historical	  analogy:	  “When	  I	  think	  about	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR,	  I	  think	  of	  Afghanistan,	  and	  when	  I	  think	  about	  the	  collapse	  of	  Russia,	  I	  think	  of	  Crimea.”	  One	  American	  participant	  agreed	  that	  Putin’s	  policy	  towards	  Ukraine	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  domestic	   politics	   of	   Russia.	   Further,	   the	   participant	   observed	   that	   Putin’s	   policy	  towards	  Ukraine	   is	  not	   fundamentally	  different	   from	  Russia’s	  policy	   towards	  Georgia	  and	  Moldova,	   and	   asked	   if	   the	   policy	   towards	  Ukraine	   is	   seen	   in	   the	  West	   as	   such	   a	  pivotal	  moment	  only	  because	  Putin	  presented	  it	  so	  dramatically	  in	  his	  March	  18,	  2014	  speech.	  A	   Russian	   participant	   noted	   that	   according	   to	   officials	   of	   the	   Russian	   Ministry	   of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	   despite	   the	   conflict	   over	  Ukraine,	   contacts	  with	   the	  United	   States	   on	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arms	  control	  continue	  and	  that	  Russia	   is	  supposedly	  open	  to	  all	  proposals.	   In	  reality,	  however,	  Russia	   is	  not	   ready	   for	  any	  new	  proposals.	  As	  he	  explained,	   “Russia	  denies	  that	  there	  is	  a	  new	  cold	  war,	  but	  this	  is	  the	  fact	  of	  life,	  and	  the	  sooner	  we	  acknowledge	  it	  the	  better	  off	  both	  sides	  will	  be	  in	  a	  search	  for	  a	  new	  modus	  vivendi.”	  Another	   Russian	   participant	   observed	   that	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   understand	   the	  psychology	  of	  both	  sides.	  Russia,	  the	  participant	  said,	  “has	  the	  complex	  of	  invasion	  –	  it	  is	  primitive,	  but	  it	  works”	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  mobilizing	  the	  Russian	  public	  in	  support	  of	  the	  government.	  This	  can	  help	  explain	  the	  Russian	  reaction	  to	  NATO	  enlargement	  and	  to	   the	   planned	   deployment	   of	   American	   missile	   defenses	   in	   Eastern	   Europe.	   The	  second	  Russian	  complex	  is	  that	  of	  technological	  determinism.	  It	  believes	  that	  anything	  that	  is	  being	  actively	  developed	  and	  designed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  will	  necessarily	  be	  deployed.	  The	  third	  complex,	  of	  course,	   is	   that	  of	  a	  Great	  Power,	   in	  which	  everything	  done	   by	   other	   nations	   must	   be	   directed	   at	   Russia,	   because	   it	   is	   such	   an	   important	  power.	  The	  speaker	  also	  observed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  does	  not	  engage	  Russia	  on	  the	  subjects	   that	   only	   Russians	   consider	   to	   be	   a	   problem	   but	   the	   Americans	   do	   not:	   for	  instance,	   precision-­‐guided	   munitions,	   missile	   defense,	   etc.	   An	   American	   participant	  observed	   that	   missile	   defense	   has	   traditionally	   been	   one	   of	   the	   biggest	   stumbling	  blocks	   in	   U.S.-­‐Soviet/Russian	   relations:	   the	   Reagan-­‐Gorbachev	   summit	   in	   Reykjavik	  stumbled	   upon	   BMD,	   as	   did	   START	   II.	   One	   cannot	   discuss	   strategic	   relations	   with	  Russia	   without	   discussing	   BMD,	   but	   the	   Kremlin’s	   refusal	   to	   accept	   the	   technical	  limitations	   of	   America’s	   proposed	   BMD	   systems	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   will	   continue	   to	  hamper	  efforts	  to	  move	  the	  discussion	  forward.	  	  
2.	  Strategic	  Stability	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  	  An	   American	   speaker	   on	   the	   panel	   noted	   that	   Russia	   and	   the	  United	   States	   do	   have	  some	   areas	   of	   agreement,	   such	   as	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   multipolar	   world,	   the	  significance	   of	   China’s	   rise	   for	   the	   nuclear	   balance	   of	   power,	   and	   the	   growing	  complexity	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   military	   power,	   which	   now	   involves	   competition	   in	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multiple	  domains.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   the	  speaker	  continued,	   there	  are	  also	   important	  areas	  of	  disagreement.	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  America’s	  efforts	  to	  develop	  BMD	  are	  viewed	  in	  Russia	  as	  a	  threat	  to	   its	  deterrent.	  The	  United	  States	  “recognizes	  Russian	  concerns	  that	  [American	  missile	  defense]	  might	  become	  a	  threat	  [to	  Russia’s	  strategic	  deterrent]	  a	  decade	  or	  more	  in	  the	  future	  and	  believes	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  avoid	  that	  outcome	  is	  to	  cooperate	  rather	  than	  compete.”	  The	  speaker	  also	  noted	  that	  Russia	  has	  taken	  steps	  to	  modify	  its	  military	  posture	  to	  ensure	  future	  effectiveness	  against	  U.S.	  BMD—a	  topic	  that	  generates	  little	  discussion.	  The	  U.S.	  had	  indicated	  that	  it	  would	  like	  to	  move	  away	  from	   Mutual	   Assured	   Destruction	   (MAD)	   towards	   a	   relationship	   based	   on	   mutual	  assured	   stability/mutual	   assured	   security,	   in	   which	   “deterrence	   would	   play	   a	  continuing	  but	  subsidiary	  role.”	  Russia,	  however,	  appears	  to	  believe	  that	  moving	  away	  from	  MAD	  puts	  it	  in	  jeopardy;	  according	  to	  one	  Russian	  participant,	  “the	  U.S.	  will	  have	  ‘freedom	  from	  attack	  and	  freedom	  to	  attack’	  that,	  sooner	  or	  later,	  will	  be	  exploited	  by	  an	  ideologically	  driven	  U.S.	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  jeopardizes	  vital	  Russian	  interests.”	  	  An	  American	  speaker	  observed	  that	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  have	  different	  views	  of	   the	   main	   threats	   to	   stability.	   The	   United	   States	   believes	   that	   “the	   big	   emerging	  security	   challenge	   is	   posed	   by	   regional	   actors	  with	   nuclear	  weapons	   and	   long-­‐range	  missiles,”	  while	  Russia	  believes	  that	  “principal	  dangers	  are	  posed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  and	  NATO,	   though	   China	   is	   rising	   as	   a	   potential	   danger;	   regional	  WMD	   actors	   are	   a	  problem	  but	   not	   a	   threat.”	   These	   “areas	   of	   disagreement	   are	   persistent	   and	   in	   some	  respects	   deepening.	   In	   these	   areas,	   dialogue	   has	   deepened	   understanding	   but	   not	  confidence	   or	   trust.	   It	   is	   unclear	   what	   further	   dialogue	   on	   these	   topics	   might	   yet	  accomplish.”	  According	   to	   the	   American	   speaker,	   such	   recent	   developments	   as	   the	   annexation	   of	  Crimea,	  the	  deep	  grievances	  against	  the	  West	  expressed	  by	  Vladimir	  Putin	  in	  his	  March	  18	   speech,	   and	  Russia’s	   apparent	   violation	   of	   the	   Intermediate	  Nuclear	   Forces	   (INF)	  Treaty	   are	   having	   an	   impact	   on	   U.S.	   perceptions	   of	   the	   security	   environment.	   The	  United	  States	  is	  paying	  attention	  to	  new	  aspects	  of	  the	  Russian	  military	  doctrine	  such	  as	   the	   “development	   of	   a	   ‘theory	   of	   victory’	   for	   regional	   conflicts	   against	   a	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conventionally	  superior	  nuclear	  power	  and	  its	  allies	  involving	  ‘pre-­‐nuclear	  deterrence’	  and,	   if	   that	   fails,	  preemptive	  use	  of	   theater	  nuclear	  weapons	   to	  deescalate	  a	  growing	  crisis.”	  Russia	  is	  also	  developing	  “new	  capabilities	  for	  theater	  conventional	  strike,	  full	  nuclear	   integration	   at	   the	   theater	   level,	   emerging	   aerospace	   defense	   capabilities	  including	  improving	  regional	  BMD,	  plus	  a	  modernization	  program	  for	  strategic	  systems	  with	   advanced	   BMD	   penetration	   aids	   (that	   also	   redresses	   long-­‐standing	   Russian	  concerns	  about	  the	  imbalance	  in	  strategic	  force	  up-­‐load	  potential).”	  From	  the	  American	  standpoint,	   these	  developments	  go	  well	  beyond	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  stable	  strategic	  bilateral	  nuclear	  balance;	  they	  “significantly	  increase	  the	  risk	  that	  Russia	  will	  challenge	  a	   NATO	   security	   guarantee	   and	   lead	   to	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   [Russia]	   faces	   a	   choice	  between	  losing	  or	   implementing	  either	   ‘pre-­‐nuclear’	  conventional	  strikes	  on	  strategic	  targets	   in	   the	  West	   or	   initiating	   nuclear	   ‘de-­‐escalation’	   strikes.”	   These	   developments	  would	  make	   conflict	   more	   likely	   and	   would	   increase	   the	   risks	   of	   nuclear	   escalation	  should	  such	  a	  conflict	  occur.	  What	  should	  the	  U.S.	  strategy	  be	  towards	  Russia?	  The	  United	  States,	  according	  to	  one	  speaker,	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  making	  significant	  adjustments	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  Russia.	  Until	  March	  2014,	  the	  U.S.	  approach	  to	  Russia	  was	  a	  laissez-­‐faire	  strategy	  with	  regard	  to	  developments	  in	  Russia’s	  strategic	  posture.	  It	  was	  generally	  held	  that	  NATO	  did	  not	  face	  an	  enemy	   in	  Russia,	  but	   this	  has	  since	  changed;	  going	   forward,	  Russia	  will	  be	  at	  the	  center	  of	  NATO	  policy	  and	  posture	  adjustments.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  “NATO	  will	  not	  abandon	  the	  long-­‐term	  vision	  of	  a	  future	  relationship	  with	  Russia	  that	  is	  more	  normal	  and	   positive.”	   Though	   it	   maintains	   plans	   against	   no	   country,	   NATO	   will	   remain	   a	  nuclear	   alliance	   so	   long	   as	   nuclear	   weapons	   remain	   within	   the	   arsenals	   of	   NATO	  member	  states.	  NATO	  supports	  territorial	  missile	  defense	  as	  a	  mission,	  but	  its	  focus	  is	  on	  threats	  emanating	  from	  the	  Middle	  East,	  not	  from	  Russia.	  The	  need	  to	  maintain	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  alliance	  and	  the	  Article	  5	  guarantee	  will	  lead	  to	  new	  efforts	  to	  mitigate	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  Putin’s	  claim	  that	  he	  is	  obliged	  to	  protect	  Russian-­‐speakers	  living	  within	   NATO	   member	   states’	   borders.	   NATO	   Planning	   will	   be	   adapted	   to	   enable	  effective	   defense	   of	   the	   Baltic	   states	   and	   any	   other	   NATO	   members	   that	   might	   be	  subject	  to	  coercion	  and	  attack,	  to	  include	  bolstering	  the	  capacity	  to	  project	  power	  into	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the	  Baltics.	  Returning	  to	  the	  persistent	  BMD	  issue,	  the	  speaker	  indicated	  that	  if	  Russia	  proceeds	   to	   deploy	   INF	   systems,	  NATO	  will	   likely	   take	   steps	   to	   re-­‐orient	   its	   nascent	  BMD	  posture	  so	  that	  it	  is	  effective	  against	  attacks	  from	  both	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  from	  Russia,	  which	  could	   include	   the	   restoration	  of	   the	  European	  Midcourse	  Radar	   (EMR)	  radar	   in	   Central	   Europe	   that	   was	   a	   part	   of	   the	   original	   “third	   site”	   plan.	   If	   NATO	  proceeds	  with	  BMD	  against	  Russia,	  however,	  it	  would	  not	  pursue	  defense	  dominance;	  rather,	   it	   would	   likely	   seek	   a	   limited	   defense	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   blunting	   Russian	  coercive	   threats.	   The	   speaker	   suggested	   that	   a	  minority	   in	   the	  U.S.	   BMD	   community	  would	  take	  advantage	  of	  this	  situation	  to	  argue	  that	  U.S.	  BMD	  homeland	  defense	  should	  be	  tailored	  to	  provide	  protection	  against	  Russian	  strategic	  strikes.	  He	  added,	  “If	  the	  INF	  treaty	   collapses,	  NATO	  will	   then	  be	   free	   to	   consider	  whether	   improved	   conventional	  strike	  capabilities	  of	  its	  own	  are	  needed	  to	  balance	  and	  deter	  the	  theater	  conventional	  strike	  capabilities	  Russia	  is	  deploying	  to	  support	  ‘pre-­‐nuclear	  deterrence.’”	  This	  could	  include	   the	   development	   and	   deployment	   of	   intermediate-­‐range	   non-­‐nuclear	   strike	  systems	  in	  Europe.	  A	   U.S.	   speaker	   further	   observed	   that	   there	   could	   be	   “adaptations	   to	   NATO’s	   nuclear	  posture.”	  These	  may	   include	  ensuring	  deterrence	   is	  effective	   for	  new	  problems	  while	  avoiding	   a	   return	   to	   Cold	   War-­‐era	   concepts	   and	   approaches.	   “Those	   new	   problems	  include	  deterring	  Russian	  nuclear	   ‘de-­‐escalation’	  strikes	  and	  also	   ‘pre-­‐nuclear’	  strikes	  of	   a	   strategic	   kind	   (i.e.,	   those	   that	   create	   extreme	   circumstances	   by	   threatening	   the	  vital	   interests	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and/or	   its	   allies).”	   He	   further	   suggested	   that	   the	  accelerated	   development	   of	   new	   U.S.	   stand-­‐off	   nuclear-­‐armed	   cruise	   missiles	   could	  compensate	   for	   any	   potential	   shortfalls	   in	   the	   perceived	   deterrence	   credibility	   of	  NATO’s	  nuclear	  sharing	  arrangements.	  	  An	  American	  noted,	  “The	  sadly	  ironic	  result	  of	  President	  Putin’s	  actions	  to	   ‘snap	  back	  hard’	   is	   that	   the	  West	   will	   now	   adapt	   its	   military	   posture	   by	   deploying	   capabilities	  tailored	  to	  deter	  Russia	  and	  defeat	  it	  if	  necessary—an	  intention	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  until	  his	  reactions	  to	  a	  Western	  strategy	  that	  does	  not	  exist.	  Of	  course,	  these	  capabilities	  will	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be	  focused	  on	  negating	  the	  threats	  Russia	  might	  make	  in	  a	  war	  against	  a	  NATO	  ally	  and	  not	  on	  negating	  its	  strategic	  posture	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  U.S.”	  A	   Russian	   speaker	   responded	   that	   the	   next	   Russian	  military	   doctrine	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  even	  worse	  from	  the	  American	  point	  of	  view.	  The	  speaker	  noted	  that	  the	  2010	  military	  doctrine	   contradicted	   the	   contemporaneous	   military	   doctrine	   on	   a	   number	   of	  important	  points,	  with	  the	  new	  military	  doctrine	  being	  much	  more	  anti-­‐American.	  The	  next	   military	   doctrine	   is	   likely	   to	   mention	   the	   United	   States	   by	   name	   as	   a	   threat,	  something	  that	  its	  predecessor	  did	  not.	  He	  explained	  that	  in	  the	  past,	  military	  doctrine	  was	  produced	  by	  an	  interagency	  process,	  which	  had	  a	  mediating	  effect	  on	  hardliners	  in	  the	  military.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  opposed	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Defense	   on	   a	   number	   of	   points,	   with	   the	   diplomats	  emphasizing	  stability	  and	  cooperation	  and	  the	  military	  emphasizing	  threats.	  This	  is	  no	  longer	   the	   case,	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   the	   military’s	   preference	   for	   a	   confrontational	  approach	  dominates	  the	  doctrine.	  	  The	  speaker	  noted	  that	  Russian	  determinations	  of	  strategic	  stability	  are	  not	  based	  on	  objective	   analysis;	   rather,	   any	   attempts	   at	   formal	   modeling	   in	   Russia	   simply	   reflect	  political	   preferences.	   Russia,	   the	   speaker	   continued,	   brands	   as	   destabilizing	   any	  weapon	  or	  system	  that	  its	  political-­‐military	  leadership	  does	  not	  like,	  be	  it	  PGMs,	  BMD,	  or	  anything	  else.	  In	  the	  speaker’s	  opinion,	  Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  should	  not	  be	  “addicted	   to	   symmetrical	  moves	   in	   development	   of	   strategic	  weapons.”	   The	   speaker	  remarked	  that	  during	  Gorbachev’s	  era,	  despite	  his	  public	  proclamations	  that	  the	  USSR	  was	  not	  going	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  symmetric	  arms	  race	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Soviets	  wasted	   billions	   of	   rubles	   on	   attempts	   at	   symmetric	   responses	   to	   the	   United	   States.	  Now,	  he	  continued,	  the	  same	  is	  happening:	  Russia	  is	  engaged	  in	  a	  concerted	  BMD	  effort	  under	   the	   cover	   of	   space	   defense.	   As	   far	   as	   undermining	   Russia’s	   relations	  with	   the	  West,	  the	  speaker	  continued,	  NATO	  enlargement	  has	  been	  much	  more	  important	  than	  BMD.	  The	  Russian	  attitude	  has	  been	  emotional,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Putin’s	  outburst,	  when	   he	   said	   that	   he	   simply	   could	   not	   imagine	  NATO	   troops	   in	   Crimea.	   This	   fear	   is	  shared	   overwhelmingly	   by	   the	   Russian	   elite,	  which	   helps	   explain	   Russia’s	   actions	   in	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Crimea:	  Russia	  reacted	  to	  what	  it	  perceived	  as	  the	  West	  crossing	  a	  red	  line.	  The	  list	  of	  destabilizing	   factors,	   from	   the	   Russian	   point	   of	   view,	   includes	   NATO’s	   conventional	  superiority	  over	  Russia	  and	  American	  breaches	  of	  international	  law	  in	  the	  Balkans	  and	  Libya.	  The	  speaker	  suggested	  that	  the	  West	  has	  viewed	  Russia	  as	  unreliable	  since	  the	  war	  with	   Georgia	   in	   2008,	   and	   he	   foresees	   a	   period	   of	   instability	   even	   after	   Putin’s	  eventual	   departure	   from	   power.	   One	   important	   condition	   for	   achieving	   strategic	  stability,	   continued	   the	   Russian	   speaker,	   is	   to	   acknowledge	   Russian	   and	   American	  zones	  of	  vital	  interest.	  It	  is	  a	  reality	  that	  Russia	  views	  the	  countries	  along	  its	  borders	  as	  its	  zone	  of	  vital	  interests,	  and	  neglecting	  this	  reality	  will	  lead	  to	  instability.	  	  During	  the	  discussion	  period	  of	  this	  panel,	  several	  Russian	  and	  American	  participants	  indicated	  that	  they	  found	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  American	  speaker	  “disturbing,”	  as	  it	  appeared	   to	   reverse	   the	   cooperative	   trend	   of	   the	   last	   25	   years.	   Regarding	   Russia’s	  military	  doctrine,	  one	  American	  participant	  observed	   that	   the	  2010	  military	  doctrine	  was	  already	  quite	  shocking	  because	  it	  mentioned	  NATO	  as	  threat,	  but	  did	  not	  mention	  either	   China	   or	   the	   threats	   emanating	   from	   Central	   Asia	   and	   Afghanistan.	   The	   same	  participant	  questioned	  why	  Russia	  is	  worried	  about	  the	  exceedingly	  distant	  prospect	  of	  Ukrainian	  membership	  in	  NATO	  and	  of	  NATO	  military	  forces	  in	  Crimea	  when	  there	  are	  more	  immediate	  and	  pressing	  security	  threats	  in	  its	  immediate	  neighborhood.	  Several	  Russian	   participants	   observed	   that	   American	   actions	   to	   assuage	   official	   Russian	  concerns	  would	  be	   ineffective	  not	   only	   because	   the	  political	   leadership	  believes	   that	  America	   is	   an	   enemy	   but	   also	   because	   Putin’s	   administration	   needs	   America	   as	   an	  external	   enemy.	  Even	   if	   the	  United	  States	  were	   to	  drop	  all	  plans	   for	  BMD	   tomorrow,	  said	  one	  Russian	  participant,	  Russia	  would	   invent	  something	  new	  to	  complain	  about,	  suggesting	   that	   “Russian	   complaints	   about	   strategic	   military	   problems	   are	   a	  verbalization	   of	   subliminal	   fears	   of	   a	   color	   revolution.	   And	   Putin	  wants	   a	   guarantee	  that	   no	   color	   revolution	   happens	   in	   Russia.”	   One	   of	   the	   American	   participants,	   a	  specialist	   on	  Russian	   politics,	   agreed	   that	   Putin	   believes	   that	   the	  West	   is	   “out	   to	   get	  him.”	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The	  debate	  then	  returned	  to	  nuclear	  weapons.	  An	  American	  participant	  observed	  that	  15	   years	   ago	   the	   U.S.	   saw	   nuclear	   arms	   control	   as	   the	   centerpiece	   of	   U.S.-­‐Russian	  relations.	  When	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  showed	  his	  disdain	  for	  arms	  control,	  Russia	  perceived	  it	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  contempt	  for	  their	  interests,	  and	  President	  Obama’s	  efforts	  to	  alleviate	   Russian	   suspicions	   have	   failed.	   The	   American	   national	   security	   community	  has	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion	  that	  no	  approach	  will	  satisfy	  Russia,	  and	  therefore	  the	  United	  States	   should	   simply	   stop	   worrying	   about	   Russia.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   Obama	  administration	   has	   noticed	   that	   Russia	   is	   modernizing	   its	   strategic	   counterforce	  capability,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  appetite	  for	  unilateral	  reductions	  on	  the	  American	  side	  –	  any	  reductions	  must	  be	  bilateral.	  	  	  
3.	  Europe:	  Problems	  of	  Regional	  Stability	  	  In	   the	  wake	  of	  Russia’s	   annexation	  of	  Crimea,	   there	  was	   a	   general	   consensus	   among	  participants	  on	  both	  sides	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  stability	  Europe	  has	  enjoyed	  since	  the	  end	  of	   the	   Cold	  War	   has	   been	   broken.	   Participants	   expressed	   their	   expectation	   of	   a	   new	  period	  of	  sustained	  instability	  in	  Europe,	  which	  will	  demand	  more	  attention	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  There	  was	  general	  agreement	  that	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years,	  the	  West	  had	   systematically	   underestimated	   the	   depth	   of	   Russia’s	   concern	   about	   Western	  intentions,	   and	   overestimated	   the	   potential	   to	  manage	   those	   concerns	   through	   such	  mechanisms	  as	  joint	  councils.	  It	  was	  further	  suggested	  that	  Russia’s	  domestic	  political	  context	  was	  pivotal	   in	  understanding	  Russia’s	   recent	   actions.	   In	   the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  Russia	  was	   focused	   internally	  and	  needed	   to	  keep	   friction	  with	   the	  West	   to	  a	  minimum.	  Today,	  however,	  Putin	  has	  seen	  that	  challenging	  the	  West	  and	  inflating	  the	  threat	   it	   poses	   plays	   very	   well	   at	   home.	   Faced	   with	   a	   moribund	   economy	   and	   a	  vulnerable	   political	   position,	   Putin	   has	   used	   patriotic	  mobilization	   and	   expansion	   to	  shore	  up	  domestic	  support	  for	  his	  regime.	  His	  March	  18	  speech,	  in	  which	  he	  asserted	  the	  right	  to	  protect	  Russian	  speakers	  everywhere,	  was	  particularly	  popular.	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The	  problem,	  according	  to	  Russian	  participants,	  is	  that	  the	  regime	  has	  now	  fallen	  into	  a	  self-­‐made	  trap	  where	  they	  must	  continue	  to	  challenge	  the	  West	  in	  new	  ways	  in	  order	  to	   maintain	   the	   support	   Putin	   has	   gained	   at	   home	   by	   challenging	   the	   West	   over	  Ukraine.	   If	   Putin	   loses	   the	   initiative,	   domestic	   support	   will	   begin	   to	   unravel	   and	  Russia’s	   deep	   economic,	   political,	   and	   social	   problems	   will	   reemerge.	   Finding	   new	  exploitable	   opportunities	   thus	   becomes	   paramount.	   Participants	   suggested	   several	  potential	  vulnerabilities	   that	  Putin	  might	  be	   tempted	  pursue,	   including	  abrogation	  of	  the	   Intermediate-­‐Range	   Nuclear	   Forces	   Treaty,	   a	   return	   to	   nuclear	   testing,	   or	  developing	  concepts	  for	  and	  conducting	  exercises	  with	  non-­‐strategic	  nuclear	  weapons	  (NSNW).	  While	  the	  military	  utility	  of	  such	  steps	  might	  be	  minimal,	  the	  political	  impact	  could	  be	  substantial.	  For	  NATO	  and	  the	  United	  States,	   the	  problem	  of	  seeking	  strategic	  stability	   in	  the	  21st	  century	   is	   complicated	  by	  Russia’s	   domestic	   instability	   and	  unpredictability;	  without	  predictability,	   stability	   is	   hard	   to	   achieve.	   Participants	   expect	   NATO	   to	   return	   to	  territorial	   defense	   as	   its	   primary	   purpose	   and	   organizing	   principle.	   Debates	   about	  changes	   in	   NATO’s	   nuclear	   force	   posture	  will	  most	   likely	   be	   shelved.	   The	   challenge,	  however,	   will	   be	   crafting	   a	   response	   that	   deters	   aggression	   at	   all	   levels.	   Russian	  participants	  noted	  that	  Putin	  is	  playing	  with	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  war,	  one	  in	  which	  fifth	  columnists	   and	   “little	   green	   men”	   are	   used	   to	   create	   ambiguity	   and	   plausible	  deniability	  while	  still	  achieving	  Putin’s	  objectives.	  As	  NATO	  debates	  sending	  troops	  to	  the	   Baltics,	   it	   will	   need	   to	   think	   hard	   about	   how	   it	  might	   respond	   to	   nontraditional	  threats	   such	   as,	   for	   example,	   the	   seizure	   of	   a	   radio	   tower	   in	   Latvia.	   Among	   possible	  NATO	  options,	  participants	  suggested	  NATO	  think	  about	  inviting	  Sweden	  and	  Finland	  to	   join	   as	   full	   members,	   or	   consider	   closing	   the	   Baltic	   and	   Black	   Sea	   Straits	   to	   the	  Russian	  Navy.	  There	  were	  mixed	  opinions	  over	  how	  far	  Putin	  might	  push	  the	  alliance;	  while	   some	   participants	   did	   not	   expect	   him	   to	   test	   Article	   V,	   there	   was	   a	   general	  recognition	   that	   the	   complicated	   nature	   of	   alliance	   politics	   remain	   a	  weak	   point	   for	  NATO.	  In	  the	  short	  term,	  NATO	  is	  being	  drawn	  together	  to	  defend	  against	  a	  revanchist	  power,	  but	  that	  sentiment	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  over	  time	  if	  Putin	  can	  be	  patient.	  Energy	  politics	  further	  complicate	  the	  picture.	  While	  much	  has	  been	  made	  of	  Europe’s	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reliance	  on	  Russian	  natural	  gas,	  Russia	  is	  equally	  reliant	  on	  European	  customers	  for	  its	  overall	   economic	  health.	  Within	  Europe,	   however,	   the	   energy	   access	  question	   affects	  alliance	  cohesion.	  Participants	  agreed	  that	  Germany	  is	  the	  key	  piece	  to	  this	  puzzle.	  	  On	  the	  topic	  of	  arms	  control,	  participants	  did	  not	  foresee	  the	  collapse	  of	  New	  START	  or	  the	   repudiation	   of	   major	   Cold	  War	   arms	   control	   agreements,	   and	   indeed	   there	   was	  recognition	  that	   in	  the	  past,	  arms	  control	  was	  often	  most	  appreciated	  when	  relations	  were	  rocky.	  Nevertheless,	  future	  negotiations	  may	  be	  jeopardized,	  and	  agreements	  will	  be	   difficult	   to	   reach	   and	   limited	   in	   scope.	   Participants	   agreed	   that	   there	   will	   be	   no	  movement	   on	   NSNW	   or	   missile	   defense	   treaties	   in	   the	   near	   term,	   though	   some	  participants	  thought	  it	  could	  be	  useful	  to	  revisit	  and	  update	  the	  Conventional	  Forces	  in	  Europe	  (CFE)	  Treaty.	  	  
	  
4.	  Middle	  East:	  Strategic	  and	  Non-­‐Strategic	  WMD	  Dynamics	  
	  Unlike	   in	   Europe	   and	   East	   Asia,	   weapons	   of	   mass	   destruction	   are	   not	   applied	   on	   a	  systematic	  basis	  to	  influence	  allies	  or	  adversaries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  As	  a	  U.S.	  panelist	  observed,	   there	   are	   no	   formal	   extended	   deterrence	   agreements	  with	  Middle	   Eastern	  states,	   thus	   limiting	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	  major	   powers.	   Instead,	   the	   U.S.	   speaker	  noted,	   the	  Middle	   East	   is	   reliant	   on	   conventional	   deterrence	   and	  defense,	  with	   large	  armies	   that	  are	   ill-­‐equipped	   to	   function	  as	  power	  projection	   instruments.	  Traditional	  notions	   of	   strategic	   stability	   don’t	   apply	   to	   the	   Middle	   East,	   he	   argued;	   rather,	   the	  region	   has	   experienced	   endemic	  warfare	   about	   long-­‐held	   political	   disputes	   between	  states.	  Domestically,	   the	  Arab	  Spring	  highlighted	   the	   internal	  problems	   in	   the	  region,	  and	   the	   aftermath	   has	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   there	   is	   no	   path	   to	   long	   term	   peace	   and	  stability	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Participants	  agreed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	  have	  little	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  internal	   dynamics	   of	   these	   states.	   For	   the	   United	   States,	   the	   Middle	   East	   throws	  America’s	   domestic	   political	   problems	   into	   stark	   relief.	   One	   American	   participant	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noted	   that	   the	   Obama	   administration	   has	   experienced	   unprecedented	   difficulties	  achieving	   consensus	   over	   responses	   to	   such	   crises	   as	   the	   Egyptian	   and	   Libyan	  revolutions,	   the	   civil	   war	   in	   Syria,	   or	   Iran’s	   pursuit	   of	   nuclear	  weapons.	   The	   United	  States,	  he	  argued,	  has	  lost	  its	  sense	  of	  how	  it	  might	  use	  force	  to	  achieve	  strategic	  ends,	  or	  what	   those	   ends	   should	   even	   look	   like.	  Nevertheless,	   its	   alliances	   and	   alignments	  within	  the	  region	  remain	  salient,	  thus	  limiting	  its	  ability	  to	  pivot	  away	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  toward	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific.	  The	  United	  States’	  reliance	  on	  functioning	  oil	  markets	  necessitates	   its	  ongoing	  involvement	   in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  which	  it	  primarily	  maintains	  through	  defense	  commitments	  and	  arms	  sales	  to	  regional	  allies	  and	  partners.	  	  Russia,	  for	  its	  part,	  views	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  a	  place	  to	  regain	  prestige	  and	  status,	  and	  as	  an	  arena	  to	  contest	  U.S.	  domination.	  One	  Russian	  participant	  suggested	  that	  some	  in	  Russia	  saw	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  revolutions	  as	  a	  provocation	  of	  the	  West	  and	  as	  a	  chance	  for	  Muslims	   to	   realize	   and	   implement	   their	   own	   political	   traditions.	   He	   argued	   that	  Putin	   sees	  parallels	   between	  Russia	   and	   the	  Muslim	  world	   as	   great	   civilizations	   that	  have	  been	  oppressed	  by	  the	  West.	  In	  this	  worldview,	  Russia	  is	  a	  natural	  partner	  for	  the	  Muslim	  world	  as	  it	  works	  against	  Western	  hegemony.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  participant	  did	  not	  believe	  Russia	  would	  be	  able	  to	  realize	  its	  ambitions	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Further,	  he	  suggested	   that	   Russia’s	   actions	   in	   the	   region	   have	   been	   in	   part	   driven	   by	   Chinese	  economic	   interest	   under	   a	   practical	   Sino-­‐Russian	   alliance.	   Russia	   also	   benefits	   from	  instability	   in	   the	   Middle	   Eastern	   energy	   markets;	   rising	   energy	   prices	   have	   been	   a	  central	  driver	  of	  Russian	  economic	  growth.	  	  Within	   this	   overarching	   context,	   participants	   discussed	   several	   Middle	   Eastern	  countries	  and	  conflicts	  that	  pose	  challenges	  or	  questions	  for	  regional	  stability	  as	  well	  as	  for	  strategic	  stability	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia.	  SYRIA	  Both	  sides	  suggested	  that	  after	  Ukraine,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  any	  U.S.-­‐Russian	  cooperation	  on	   Syria	   is	   extremely	   low.	   One	   Russian	   participant	   saw	   the	   Ukrainian	   crisis	   as	  connected	   to	   the	   situation	   in	   Syria,	   and	  noted	   that	  Russia	   is	   unable	   to	   deal	  with	   the	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Syrian	   opposition.	   Russia	   fears	   that	   Islamist	   fighters	   will	   return	   to	   Russia	   after	  participating	  in	  the	  Syrian	  war;	  the	  participant	  said	  that	  2,000	  mujahedeen	  from	  Russia	  were	  in	  Syria,	  and	  that	  as	  they	  come	  back,	  they	  will	  kindle	  Islamic	  absolutism	  in	  Russia.	  The	  potential	  for	  radical	  Islam	  to	  spread	  to	  Russia’s	  Muslim	  population	  brings	  with	  it	  the	  specter	  of	  terrorism.	  	  IRAN	  Iran’s	   pursuit	   of	   a	   nuclear	   capability	   generated	   significant	   discussion	   as	   well	   as	  significant	   disagreement	   over	   the	   effects	   of	   potential	   Iranian	   nuclearization.	   One	  participant	  argued	  that	  the	  deterioration	  of	  U.S.-­‐Russian	  relations	  would	  have	  its	  most	  serious	  consequences	  in	  the	  efforts	  to	  negotiate	  Iran’s	  nuclear	  future.	  	  While	  participants	  agreed	  that	  an	  Iranian	  nuclear	  weapon	  was	  not	  ideal,	  most	  did	  not	  see	  military	  force	  as	  a	  viable	  response	  at	  this	  stage.	  One	  U.S.	  participant	  suggested	  that	  even	   if	   Iran	  went	   nuclear,	   it	  would	   soon	   come	   to	   learn	   that	   nuclear	  weapons	   aren’t	  particularly	   useful	   weapons,	   and	   in	   the	   long	   run	   a	   nuclear	   Iran	   might	   not	   be	  particularly	   problematic.	   The	  difficult	   period	   of	   nuclear	   learning,	   however,	  would	   be	  dangerous,	  particularly	  as	  Iranian	  thinking	  about	  doctrine,	  command	  and	  control,	  and	  deterrence	  remains	  opaque.	  	  
	  
5.	  India,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Afghanistan:	  Strategic	  and	  Non-­‐Strategic	  
WMD	  Dynamics	  	  Efforts	  to	  share	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  to	  promote	  confidence-­‐building	  mechanisms	  and	  arms	  control	   treaties	   in	  South	  Asia	  have	  met	  with	  minimal	   success.	  One	   participant	   with	   deep	   experience	   in	   conducting	   South	   Asian	   Track	   II	   dialogues	  explained	  that	  the	  South	  Asian	  strategic	  community	  rejects	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	   though	   there	   has	   been	   some	   evidence	   that	   they	   have	   gradually	   absorbed	   the	  principles	  and	  recognized	  that	  the	  dilemmas	  faced	  by	  the	  United	  States	  and	  USSR	  also	  exist	  in	  South	  Asia.	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  all	  the	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  and	  other	  platforms	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for	  discussion,	  according	  to	  a	  Russian	  participant,	  South	  Asia’s	  difficulty	  in	  agreeing	  to	  meaningful	  confidence-­‐building	  measures	  or	  arms	  control	  treaties	  is	  rooted	  in	  several	  interconnected	  issues.	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  are	  both	  building	  up	  and	  modernizing	  their	  arsenals,	  which	  is	  difficult	  to	  limit	  when	  neither	  side	  feels	  it	  has	  a	  secure	  second-­‐strike	  capability.	  Further,	  Pakistan	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  mere	  parity	  with	  India;	  rather,	  it	  seeks	  an	  advantage	  in	  the	  nuclear	  realm	  to	  make	  up	  for	  its	  conventional	  weakness	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  India.	  Meanwhile,	  India	  does	  not	  view	  Pakistan	  as	  a	  co-­‐equal	  state,	  and	  is	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  mutual	  vulnerability	  with	  Pakistan;	  India	  views	  its	  nuclear	  arsenal	  as	  directed	  at	  China,	   and	   equality	   for	   Pakistan	  would	  weaken	  New	  Delhi	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   China.	   India	   has	  also	  expressed	  its	  unwillingness	  to	  exchange	  even	  basic	  information	  about	  its	  nuclear	  weapons	  within	  an	  arms	  control	  framework,	  lest	  that	  information	  be	  stolen	  by	  China.	  	  Recent	   political	   changes	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   generate	   significant	   changes	   to	   the	  security	  dynamics	  of	  the	  region,	  but	  it’s	  unclear	  at	  this	  stage	  how	  that	  will	  play	  out.	  The	  overwhelming	   success	   of	   India’s	   BJP	   in	   the	   recent	   elections	   provides	   Prime	  Minister	  Narendra	   Modi	   with	   substantial	   latitude	   in	   governing,	   even	   as	   the	   party’s	   tendency	  toward	  hawkish	  positions	  could	  prove	  problematic	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  crisis.	  One	  Russian	  participant	   drew	   parallels	   between	  Modi	   and	   Putin,	   suggesting	   that	   for	   political	   and	  strategic	   reasons,	   Modi	   will	   need	   to	   demonstrate	   his	   willingness	   to	   protect	   Indians	  anywhere.	  Pakistan	  also	   conducted	   successful	   elections	   in	  2013,	   though	   it	   is	   still	   too	  early	  to	  tell	  whether	  the	  civilian	  government	  will	  be	  able	  to	  gain	  and	  maintain	  political	  control	  over	  the	  military.	  	  Afghanistan	   is	   currently	   awaiting	   the	   results	   of	   national	   elections	   that	   will	   see	   the	  departure	  of	  Hamid	  Karzai	  after	  thirteen	  years	  as	  President.	  The	  U.S.	  withdrawal	  from	  Afghanistan	   has	   left	   some	   experts	   questioning	   whether	   the	   U.S.	   will	   start	   to	   lose	  interest	   in	  South	  Asia	  as	   it	  continues	  to	  pivot	  towards	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific,	   though	  others	  suggest	   that	   India	   is	  well	   positioned	   to	   act	   as	   the	   lynchpin	   to	   the	   rebalance	   strategy	  even	  as	  India	  seeks	  to	  avoid	  angering	  China	  or	  falling	  into	  a	  commitment	  trap	  with	  the	  United	  States.	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For	  Russia,	   the	  primary	   goal	   is	   to	   build	   a	   security	   community	   in	  Central	  Asia	   that	   is	  capable	  of	  dealing	  with	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  terrorist	  migration	  from	  Central	  Asia	  into	  Russia.	   One	   Russian	   participant	   stated	   that	   Russia	   is	   attempting	   to	   balance	   its	  involvement	   in	  Afghanistan	  with	   its	   relations	  with	  Pakistan	   in	  order	   to	  develop	  new	  arms	  markets.	   Russia’s	   engagement	  with	   China	   also	   opens	   the	  way	   to	   the	   Pakistani	  arms	   market.	   While	   Russia	   will	   have	   active	   dialogue	   with	   Kabul,	   Beijing,	   and	  Islamabad,	   however,	   this	   participant	   suggested	   that	   prospects	   for	   real	   cooperation	  exist	  only	  between	  Moscow	  and	  New	  Delhi.	  Russia	  sees	   its	  comparative	  advantage	  to	  be	   in	   strategic	   projects,	   such	   as	   aircraft	   carriers,	   nuclear	   submarines,	   and	   advanced	  missiles,	   where	   competitors	   like	   Israel,	   Germany,	   France,	   and	   the	   United	   States	   are	  reluctant	  to	  cooperate	  with	  India.	  	  
6.	  China,	  Japan,	  and	  the	  Koreas	  	  During	   this	   panel,	   there	   was	   significant	   discussion	   about	   China’s	   nuclear	  modernization	   efforts	   and	   their	   impact	   on	   nuclear	   doctrine	   and	   strategy.	   China	  maintains	  a	  no-­‐first-­‐use	  policy	  and	  a	  strategy	  of	  minimum	  deterrence,	  reflected	  in	  their	  estimated	   250	   warheads	   and	   180	   missiles	   and	   nuclear-­‐capable	   aircraft.1	  As	   their	  nuclear	  capabilities	   improve,	  however,	   some	  participants	  predicted	   that	  China	  would	  move	   to	   a	   limited	   deterrent	   position,	   in	   which	   China	   saw	   its	   nuclear	   weapons	   as	  capable	  of	  deterring	  conventional	  attacks,	  even	  if	  they	  continued	  to	  publicly	  embrace	  a	  no	   first	   use	   doctrine.	   Recent	   and	   forthcoming	   technical	   developments	   have	   included	  new	  generations	  of	  ballistic	  and	  cruise	  missiles,	  new	  strategic	  bombers,	   and	   the	   first	  combat	  patrols	  of	   the	   Jin-­‐class	  ballistic	  missile	  submarine,	  as	  well	  as	  advancement	   in	  anti-­‐satellite	   weaponry	   and	   anti-­‐submarine	   warfare	   capabilities.	   One	   Russian	  participant	  pointed	  out	  the	  vast	  resources	  being	  invested	  in	  research	  and	  development	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Both	  American	  and	  Russian	  participants	  judged	  reports	  that	  China	  has	  3,000+	  warheads	  hidden	  in	  tunnels	  to	  
be	  non-­‐credible,	  based	  on	  fissile	  material	  production	  rate,	  the	  number	  of	  known	  delivery	  platforms,	  and	  the	  
production	  rate	  for	  delivery	  systems.	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but	   noted	   that	   comparatively	   little	   is	   being	   devoted	   to	   full-­‐scale	   production	   of	   any	  particular	  missile.	  He	  concluded	  that	  China	  does	  not	  yet	  have	  systems	  it	  deems	  worth	  producing	  en	  masse,	  but	  that	  when	  a	  system	  is	  seen	  as	  bringing	  the	  desired	  results,	  it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  shift	  resources	  to	  production	  quickly.	  Platforms	  may	  grow	  rapidly	  and	  unexpectedly,	   causing	   a	   deep	   transformation	   in	   how	   the	   Chinese	   nuclear	   arsenal	   is	  maintained	  and	  controlled.	  Russia	  and	  China	  continue	  to	  cooperate	  in	  the	  development	  of	   strategic	   systems,	   with	   Russia	   acting	   as	   a	   provider	   of	   key	   components,	   including	  engines,	  missile	  homing	  systems,	  and	  other	  specialized	  systems.	  	  Neither	  American	  nor	  Russian	  participants	  saw	  the	   foundations	   for	  strategic	  stability	  with	  China,	   though	  for	  different	  reasons.	  For	  the	  United	  States,	   there	   is	  no	  consensus	  around	   accepting	   mutual	   vulnerability	   with	   China,	   which	   is	   a	   necessary	   and	  foundational	  element	  to	  strategic	  stability.	  While	  some	  in	  the	  United	  States	  recognize	  that	   vulnerability	   exists,	   there	   is	   disagreement	   about	   whether	   to	   acknowledge	   it	  publicly;	  as	  one	  participant	  explained,	  “it	  would	  have	  repercussions	  for	  ally	  assurance,	  and	  there	  is	  little	  chance	  China	  would	  change	  its	  behaviour	  in	  any	  way.”	  For	  Russia,	  the	  threat	   from	   Chinese	   nuclear	   modernization	   is	   even	   more	   acute;	   as	   one	   Russian	  participant	   noted,	   any	   Chinese	   intermediate-­‐range	   ballistic	   missile	   is	   a	   strategic	  weapon	  to	  Russia,	  and	  even	  short-­‐range	  weapons	  can	  reach	  Russian	  Far	  Eastern	  cities.	  The	   Russian	   response	   has	   been	   the	   development	   and	   expansion	   of	   the	   naval	  component	   of	   its	   nuclear	   forces,	   including	   the	   revitalization	   of	   the	   ballistic	   missile	  submarine	   (SSBN)	   base	   in	   Kamchatka	   and	   the	   development	   of	   a	   new	   generation	   of	  SSBNs	   and	   submarine-­‐launched	   ballistic	   missiles.	   In	   the	   short	   term,	   Russian	  participants	   did	   not	   see	   China	   as	   an	   active	   threat,	   but	   expressed	   their	   concern	   that	  much	  depended	  on	  China’s	  political	  development	  over	  the	  next	  10	  years.	  According	  to	  one	  American	  participant,	   the	  key	   to	  Chinese	  strategic	   stability	   in	   regard	   to	  both	   the	  United	   States	   and	   Russia	   would	   be	   for	   China	   to	   feel	   confident	   in	   its	   retaliatory	  capability	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  produce	  enough	  political	  pain	  to	  deter	  any	  initial	  attack.	  	  Meanwhile,	   China	   has	   indicated	   that	   it	   is	   not	   interested	   in	   discussing	   formal	   arms	  control	  agreements	  until	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	  have	  drawn	  down	  much	  further.	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One	   Russian	   participant	   suggested	   that	   given	   their	   huge	   investment	   in	   research,	  development,	   and	   rapid	   prototyping,	   it’s	   unlikely	   that	   China	   will	   engage	   in	   arms	  control	   until	   its	   transformation	   of	   its	   nuclear	   forces	   has	   reached	   some	   sort	   of	  conclusion.	   Without	   greater	   clarity	   about	   China’s	   intentions	   for	   its	   nuclear	   arsenal,	  however,	   agreements	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Russia	   on	   a	   successor	   to	   New	  START	  will	  be	  very	  difficult.	  	  Both	   sides	   agreed	   that	   North	   Korea	   seems	   committed	   to	   developing	   a	   nuclear	  capability	  and	  delivery	  system	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  being	  able	  to	  strike	  the	  United	  States	  or	  its	  allies.	  Participants	  disagreed	  about	  how	  advanced	  North	  Korea’s	  missile	  capabilities	  were,	  with	  some	  suggesting	  that	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  tests	  suggests	  they	  still	  have	  a	  long	   way	   to	   go.	   Other	   participants,	   however,	   noted	   that	   North	   Korea	   is	   building	   its	  ballistic	  missiles	  off	  of	  existing	  missile	  designs,	  and	  that	  testing	  activity	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  particularly	  useful	  measure	  of	  progress.	  For	  North	  Korea,	  tests	  have	  thus	  far	  been	   primarily	   political	   statements,	   rather	   than	   part	   of	   an	   integrated	   program	   of	  weapon	   development.	   One	   participant	   argued	   that	   the	   question	   is	   not	  whether	   they	  can	   reach	   100%	   certainty,	   but	   whether	   they	   can	   raise	   sufficient	   doubts	   in	   an	  adversary’s	  mind	  about	  their	  ability	  to	  conduct	  a	  nuclear	  strike.	  Beyond	  their	  nuclear	  capabilities,	  North	  Korea’s	  penchant	  for	  small-­‐scale	  attacks	  against	  South	  Korea,	  such	  as	   the	   Cheonan	   incident	   or	   the	   shelling	   of	   Yeonpyeong	   Island,	   remains	   highly	  problematic.	   In	   response	   to	   these	   provocations,	   South	  Korea	   has	   adopted	   “proactive	  deterrence,”	   which	   includes	   requirements	   for	   pre-­‐emption	   and,	   according	   to	   one	  American	  participant,	  “greatly	  enflames	  the	  danger	  of	  escalation.”	  For	   the	   United	   States,	   assurance	   of	   Japan	   and	   South	   Korea	   remain	   high	   priorities.	  These	   countries	   face	   a	   scale	   of	   challenges	   and	   threats	   from	   China	   and	   North	   Korea,	  though	  the	  threat	  to	  South	  Korea	  from	  China	   is	  seen	  to	  be	  fairly	  minimal.	  On	  the	   low	  end,	  North	  Korea’s	  small-­‐scale	  attacks	  and	  China’s	  use	  of	  grey	  zone	  tactics	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  and	  declarations	  of	  expansive	  maritime	  claims	  present	  potential	  vectors	  for	  hostilities	  to	  escalate.	  Further	  nuclear	  developments	  by	  China	  and	  North	  Korea	  could	  intensify	   these	   stability-­‐instability	   paradox	   dynamics.	   At	   the	   mid-­‐level,	   changing	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nuclear	   postures	   could	   increase	   the	   potential	   for	   conventional	   conflict,	   and	   for	   the	  United	  States’	  allies,	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  threats	  to	  the	  United	  States	  homeland	  could	  reduce	   America’s	  willingness	   to	   defend	   them	   in	   a	   crisis.	   To	  mitigate	   these	   risks,	   the	  United	  States	  has	  pursued	  conventional	  superiority	  and	  missile	  defense;	  while	  this	  has	  had	   implications	   for	   U.S.-­‐China	   relations,	   according	   to	   one	   participant,	   America	   has	  decided	  that	  the	  missile	  threat	  from	  North	  Korea	  is	  “too	  acute	  and	  present	  to	  sacrifice	  the	   defense	   of	   the	   homeland	   and	   allies	   to	   China’s	   implacable	   concerns.”	   Some	  participants	   questioned	  whether	   Japan	   and	   South	   Korea	   are	   confident	   in	   the	   United	  States’	   extended	   deterrence	   commitments,	   and	   others	   questioned	   whether	   these	  countries	   might	   –	   or	   should	   –	   pursue	   their	   own	   nuclear	   forces.	   One	   American	  participant	   argued	   that	   the	   United	   States’	   power	   in	   Asia	   is	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   our	  alliances.	   If	  either	   Japan	  or	  South	  Korea	  chose	   to	  acquire	  nuclear	  weapons,	   the	  other	  would	   probably	   follow	   suit,	   and	   the	   raison	   d’etre	   of	   the	   alliance	   would	   evaporate,	  taking	   with	   it	   America’s	   relevance	   and	   influence	   in	   the	   region	   and	   leaving	   greater	  tensions	   between	   more	   nuclear-­‐armed	   countries.	   Another	   American	   participant	  argued	   that	   such	   an	   unravelling	   of	   the	   Non-­‐Proliferation	   Treaty	   (NPT)	   would	   have	  grave	  consequences	  for	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  particularly	  their	  commercial	  sectors.	  	  	  
7.	  The	  Russian	  Military	  and	  Strategic	  Stability	  	  As	  described	  by	  a	  Russian	  expert,	  after	   the	  war	  against	  Georgia	   in	  2008,	   the	  Russian	  leadership	  realized	   that	  even	  after	  eight	  years	  of	   significant	   investment	   in	   the	  armed	  forces,	  the	  Russian	  military	  was	  outmoded.	  With	  this	  realization,	  a	  major	  reform	  of	  the	  armed	   forces	  was	  undertaken.	  Large-­‐scale	  changes	   took	  place:	  130,000	  officer	  billets	  were	  cut	  together	  with	  90,000	  billets	  of	  “praporshchik”	  (the	  Russian	  equivalent	  of	  an	  non-­‐commissioned	  officer).	  Between	  70	  and	  80	  percent	  of	  units	  and	  formations	  were	  eliminated.	  The	  organization	  of	  the	  military	  changed	  from	  divisions	  to	  brigades,	  with	  a	  few	   exceptions	   such	   as	   Airborne	   Troops.	   The	   number	   of	   units	   in	   the	   armed	   forces	  decreased	  eleven	  fold,	  from	  1189	  to	  179.	  The	  aim	  of	  these	  reforms	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	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each	   unit	   is	   fully	  manned	   at	   all	   times,	   allowing	   it	   to	   go	   into	   combat	  without	   further	  mobilization.	   The	   result	   has	   been	   a	   wholesale	   rejection	   of	   the	   mobilization-­‐based	  model	  of	  the	  military	  that	  had	  been	  in	  existence	  since	  the	  1860s	  but	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  effective,	  as	  proven	  in	  the	  Georgian	  war,	  when	  eighty	  percent	  of	  all	  military	  units	  were	  not	   battle-­‐ready.	   This	   new	   model	   promised	   greater	   effectiveness	   and	   more	   rapid	  mobilization	  times.	  According	   to	   this	   speaker,	   a	   new	   system	   of	   military	   education	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	  create	   the	  personnel	  needed	   to	  operate	  under	   this	  new	  model.	  A	  new	  type	  of	  officer,	  educated	  and	  confident,	  must	  be	   trained,	  along	  with	  new	   types	  of	  NCOs	  and	  enlisted	  men.	  Minister	   of	  Defense	  Anatoly	   Serdyukov	   (2007-­‐2012)	  was	   charged	  with	  making	  these	  changes.	  Serdyukov	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  American	  system	  of	  military	  education.	  He	  wanted	  to	  unite	  all	  Russian	  institutions	  of	  military	  higher	  education,	  of	  which	  there	  were	   65	   in	   2008,	   into	   four	   educational	   and	   research	   centers.	   At	   present,	   Russian	  officers	   spend	   about	   10	   years	   in	   education	   and	   training.	   Serdyukov’s	   idea	   was	   for	  officers	   to	   receive	   four	   years	   of	   basic	   education	   and	   training,	   then	   regularly	   attend	  short	  courses	  of	  6-­‐10	  months,	  which	  would	  be	  required	  for	  promotion.	  	  If	   this	  system	  were	   implemented,	   the	  authorities	  would	  have	  received	  well-­‐educated,	  self-­‐confident	  personnel.	  But	  Putin	  needs	  officers	  who	  will	  carry	  out	  any	  order	  given,	  whether	  legal	  or	  not,	  and	  educated,	  self-­‐confident	  people	  may	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  do	  so.	  Problems	   arose	   also	   from	   Putin’s	   insistence	   on	   a	   one-­‐million-­‐men-­‐strong	   military	  	  (Serdyukov’s	  reforms	  would	  have	   inevitably	  resulted	   in	  a	   less	   than	  a	  million	   troops).	  According	  to	  Putin,	  a	  smaller	  military	  does	  not	  fit	  his	  image	  of	  Russia	  as	  a	  great	  power.	  It	   is	   impossible,	   however,	   for	  Russia	   to	  maintain	   a	  military	  of	   such	  a	   size	  because	  of	  demographic	   problems.	   To	   have	   one	   million	   men	   under	   arms	   would	   require	  conscripting	   all	   young	   men	   of	   draft	   age,	   and,	   in	   the	   process,	   ruining	   the	   system	   of	  higher	  education.	  The	   reform	   process	   was	   halted	   in	   2012	   and	   Serdyukov	   was	   fired	   –	   officially	   for	  corruption,	   though	   according	   to	   a	   Russian	   speaker,	   he	   was	   no	   more	   corrupt	   than	  others	  in	  Putin’s	  entourage.	  Rather,	  he	  was	  fired	  because	  the	  military	  reform	  went	  too	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far,	   in	  Putin’s	  opinion,	  by	   threatening	   to	  create	  a	  highly	  professional	   (in	   the	  Western	  sense)	  officer	  corps	  and	  making	   it	  clear	  that	  a	   force	  of	  a	  million	  was	  both	   impossible	  and	  unnecessary.	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   reforms	   did	   bolster	   Russia’s	   military	   effectiveness,	   as	   was	  demonstrated	  in	  Crimea.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reform	  effort,	  Russia	  has	  a	  rapid	  deployment	  force,	  mostly	  comprised	  of	  volunteers.	  This	  includes	  the	  Airborne	  Troops	  (VDV),	  which	  recently	  formed	  29	  battalions	  of	  volunteer	  paratroopers;	  six	  brigades	  of	  marines;	  nine	  brigades	  of	   the	  Main	  Intelligence	  Directorate	  of	  the	  General	  Staff	  (GRU);	  and	  three	  or	  four	   elite	   ground	   forces	   units—altogether	   between	   50,000	   and	   80,000	   men.	   These	  forces	  showed	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  Crimea,	  though	  it	  was	  not	  the	  takeover	  of	  Crimea	  itself	   that	   was	   so	   impressive:	   that	   operation	   could	   have	   been	   carried	   out	   by	   two	  brigades	  of	  GRU	  because	  of	  Russian	  troops	  already	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  the	  support	  of	  the	  population.	  Much	  more	  impressive,	  however,	  was	  the	  rapid	  deployment	  of	  forces	  to	  the	   Ukrainian	   border,	   which	   took	   less	   than	   three	   days—a	   major	   achievement	   for	  Russian	  troops.	  By	  comparison,	  when	  the	  Chechen	  rebels	  invaded	  Dagestan	  in	  1999,	  it	  took	   two	   and	   a	   half	   weeks	   to	   deploy	   Russian	   troops	   from	   the	   Volgograd	   area	   to	  Dagestan.	  	  This	  military	  reform	  was	  promoted	   for	  many	  years	  by	   liberal,	  pro-­‐Western	  Russians,	  who	   wanted	   to	   make	   the	   Russian	   military	   more	   like	   the	   U.S.	   armed	   forces:	   all	  volunteer,	   flexible,	   mobile,	   and	   not	   dependent	   on	   extensive	   and	   time-­‐consuming	  mobilization.	  For	  many	  years,	  the	  government	  and	  the	  Russian	  military	  resisted.	  Now,	  some	   major	   elements	   of	   the	   reform	   advocated	   by	   Russian	   liberals	   have	   been	  implemented	  –	  and	  these	  liberal	  ideas	  are	  serving	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  quite	  well.	  This	  military	  reform	  will	  have	  a	  serious	  impact	  on	  strategic	  stability	  in	  Europe	  and	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Russian	  argument	  was	  that	  their	  conventional	  forces	  were	  so	  weak	  that	  they	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  rely	  on	  nuclear	  forces.	  Today,	  Russia	  has	  more	  or	   less	   effective	   conventional	   forces,	   though	  not	   sufficient	   to	   stand	  up	   against	   either	  China	  or	  NATO.	  These	   forces	   cannot	  be	  made	  much	   larger	  because	  of	  demographies.	  Thus,	   for	   a	   wider	   conflict,	   Russia	   still	   must	   rely	   on	   nuclear	   weapons,	   even	   as	   its	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successes	  in	  Georgia	  and	  Ukraine	  may	  have	  made	  the	  Kremlin	  more	  inclined	  to	  accept	  risks	   of	   small-­‐scale	   conflicts	   along	   its	   periphery;	   these	   conflicts,	   however,	   may	  unexpectedly	   escalate	   to	   large-­‐scale	   wars	   that	   Russia	   could	   contain	   only	   using	   its	  nuclear	  weapons.	  During	  the	  period	  of	  Putin's	  rule,	  the	  Kremlin	  has	  understood	  relations	  between	  Russia	  and	   the	   United	   States	   to	   be	   based	   on	   nuclear	   deterrence.	   This	   relationship	   model	  allowed	   Moscow	   to	   feel	   equal	   to	   Washington	   and	   provided	   Moscow	   with	   the	  opportunity	   to	   make	   regular	   claims	   that	   U.S.	   actions	   violated	   strategic	   stability.	   In	  recent	   years,	   as	   was	   discussed	   earlier,	   these	   complaints	   have	   revolved	   around	   U.S.	  plans	   for	  BMD	  and	   conventional	  PGMs.	   In	  one	  Russian	   speaker’s	   opinion,	   both	   these	  issues	   have	   been	   used	   as	   pretexts	   to	   express	   in	  military	   terms	   the	   entirely	   different	  complaints	  and	  fears	  of	  the	  Kremlin	  (i.e.,	  Putin’s	  belief	  that	  the	  West	  is	  responsible	  for	  all	   the	   "color	   revolutions"	   in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Central	  Asia	   and	  his	  belief	   that	   the	  West	  is	  preparing	  to	  organize	  another	  one—this	  time	  in	  Russia).	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Conclusions	  and	  Recommendations	  	  U.S.	  and	  Russian	  views	  of	  challenges	  to	  strategic	  stability	  in	  several	  crucial	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  differ	  substantially,	   the	  gap	  only	  made	  wider	  by	  the	  sharp	  deterioration	  of	  U.S.-­‐Russian	  relations,	  which	  is	  unlikely	  be	  reversed	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  It	  will	  take	  time	  and	  a	  change	  in	  the	  international	  political	  situation	  toward	  a	  relaxation	  of	  tensions	  to	  overcome	  this	  crisis	  and	  resume	  cooperation	  on	  strategic	  stability.	  	  	  Participants	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   dialogue	   were	   concerned	   that	   the	   general	  deterioration	   of	   U.S.–Russian	   relations	   was	   having	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   strategic	  stability.	  The	  Russian	  elites	  viewed	  U.S.	  actions	  regarding	  strategic	  systems	  specifically,	  and	  international	  politics	  in	  general,	  as	  destabilizing.	  The	  greatest	  irritants	  continue	  to	  be	   U.S.	   missile	   defense	   plans	   and	   conventional	   Prompt	   Global	   Strike,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  American	   use	   of	   force	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	   and,	   especially,	   support	   for	   Ukraine	   in	   its	  conflict	  with	  Russia.	  The	  two	  countries’	  visions	  for	  strengthening	  strategic	  stability	  are	  drastically	  different.	  While	  the	  United	  States	  has	  stated	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  that	  it	  would	   like	   to	   move	   away	   from	   nuclear	   deterrence,	   Russia	   considers	   it	   to	   be	   the	  mainstay	   of	   its	   security.	   The	   main	   threats	   to	   the	   United	   States	   are	   regional	   actors	  armed	  with	   nuclear	   weapons	   and	   long-­‐range	   delivery	   systems,	   while	   for	   Russia	   the	  main	   threats	   are	   the	   United	   States	   and	   NATO,	   with	   China	   as	   a	   potential	   danger.	  Regional	  actors	  that	  have	  or	  may	  acquire	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  but	  not	  a	  threat.	  	  	  The	   situation	   is	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   threat	   analysis	   in	   Russia	   has	  become	  highly	   politicized	   and	   expert	   opinion	   is	   ignored	   if	   it	   does	   not	   fit	   in	  with	   the	  preferences	   of	   Vladimir	   Putin.	   Some	   of	   the	   Russian	   participants	   suggested	   that	   the	  Kremlin’s	   complaints	   about	   American	  missile	   defense	   and	   conventional	   PGS	   are	   are	  rooted	  in	  the	  Russian	  concern	  that	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  American	  policy	  is	  regime	  change	  in	  Russia.	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The	  existing	  nuclear	  arms	  control	  agreements	  (such	  as	  New	  START	  and	  the	  INF	  Treaty)	  may	  survive,	  but	  it	  is	  quite	  likely	  that	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  1970s	  there	  will	  be	  no	  strategic	   arms	   control	   agreement	   when	   New	   START	   expires	   in	   2020.	   The	   factor	   of	  China	   is	   another	   stumbling	   block:	   until	   China’s	   plans	   for	   the	   future	   of	   its	   nuclear	  arsenal	   are	   clear,	   Russia	   is	   not	   likely	   to	   engage	   in	   further	   reductions	   of	   nuclear	  weapons.	   The	   only	   hope	   for	   a	   renewed	   process	   of	   reductions	   of	   strategic	   nuclear	  weapons	  would	  be	  a	  slowdown	  of	  Russia’s	  economy	  that	  would	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  maintain	  the	  current	  size	  of	  its	  strategic	  forces.	  	  In	   the	   unanimous	   opinion	   of	   the	   Russian	   participants,	   there	   is	   little	   chance	   for	  successful	   negotiations	   on	   the	   reductions	   of	   non-­‐strategic	   nuclear	   weapons	   or	   on	  missile	   defense.	   The	   Russian	   government	   considers	   NSNW	   as	   essential	   for	  compensating	   for	   the	   relative	   weakness	   of	   their	   conventional	   forces	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   NATO	  and	   China,	   and	   it	   views	   American	   missile	   defense	   plans	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   destroy	  Russia’s	  ability	  to	  deter	  an	  American	  nuclear	  attack.	  	  The	   military	   reform	   carried	   out	   by	   Russia	   between	   2008	   and	   2012	   has	   created	   a	  potential	   challenge	   to	   strategic	   stability.	   Russia	   now	   has	   a	   capability	   to	   conduct	  operations	   against	   its	   small	   neighbors	   relying	   primarily	   on	   its	   special	   forces;	   it	   does	  not,	   however,	   have	   conventional	   forces	   sufficient	   for	   a	   conflict	  with	   NATO	   or	   China.	  Emboldened	   by	   its	   success	   in	   Georgia	   and	   Ukraine,	   Russia	  may	   be	  more	   inclined	   to	  accept	  risks	  of	  small-­‐scale	  conflicts	  along	  its	  periphery;	  these	  conflicts,	  however,	  may	  unexpectedly	   escalate	   to	   large-­‐scale	   wars	   that	   Russia	   could	   contain	   only	   using	   its	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Russia	  views	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  a	  place	  to	  regain	  prestige	  and	  status,	  and	  as	  an	  arena	  to	  contest	  U.S.	  domination.	  Both	  sides	  suggested	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis	  over	  Ukraine,	  the	   likelihood	   of	   any	   U.S.-­‐Russian	   cooperation	   on	   Syria	   is	   extremely	   low.	   One	  participant	   argued	   that	   the	   deterioration	   of	   U.S.-­‐Russian	   relations	   would	   have	   their	  most	  serious	  consequences	  in	  the	  efforts	  to	  negotiate	  Iran’s	  nuclear	  future.	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Maintaining	   strategic	   stability	   in	   South	   Asia	   is	   a	   relatively	   low	   priority	   for	   Russia.	  Regarding	  that	  region,	  Russia’s	  primary	  concern	  is	  the	  rise	  of	  Islamic	  fundamentalism	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan	  that	  could	  spread	  into	  Central	  Asia.	  The	  United	  States,	   in	  contrast,	   is	   concerned	   about	   the	   potential	   for	   conflict	   in	   the	   China-­‐India-­‐Pakistan	  triangle.	  While	  Russia	  and	   the	  United	  States	  do	  not	  compete	  (except	   in	  arms	  sales	   to	  India)	   in	   South	   Asia,	   there	   is	   little	   ground	   for	   cooperation	   in	   maintaining	   strategic	  stability	  there.	  	  There	   may	   be	   grounds	   in	   the	   future	   for	   a	   common	   understanding	   regarding	   China.	  Neither	  American	  nor	  Russian	  participants	  saw	  the	   foundations	   for	  strategic	  stability	  with	  China,	  though	  for	  different	  reasons.	  In	  the	  short	  term,	  Russian	  participants	  did	  not	  see	   China	   as	   an	   active	   threat,	   but	   expressed	   their	   concern	   that	   much	   depended	   on	  China’s	   political	   development	   over	   the	   next	   10	   years.	   One	   Russian	   participant	  suggested	   that	   given	   China’s	   huge	   investment	   in	   research,	   development,	   and	   rapid	  prototyping,	  it’s	  unlikely	  that	  China	  will	  engage	  in	  arms	  control	  until	  its	  transformation	  of	   its	   nuclear	   forces	   has	   reached	   some	   sort	   of	   conclusion.	   The	   crisis	   in	   Ukraine	   has	  pushed	   Russia	   closer	   to	   China,	   but	   this	   rapprochement	   has	   been	   forced	   by	  circumstances;	  if	  and	  when	  U.S.–Russian	  relations	  improve,	  some	  discrete	  cooperation	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  China	  would	  be	  possible.	  	  	  	  For	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  assurance	  of	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  remain	  high	  priorities,	  and	  therefore	  North	  Korea’s	  pursuit	  of	  nuclear	  capabilities	  represent	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  strategic	  stability	  in	  the	  region.	  For	  Russia,	  North	  Korea	  is	  only	  a	  limited	  problem;	  it	  will	  follow	  China’s	  lead	  in	  dealing	  with	  North	  Korea.	  Stepping	  back	   from	   this	   recent	  dialogue,	  Russian	  policy	   is	  difficult	   to	  predict	   for	   two	  reasons.	  One,	  all	  important	  decisions	  are	  made	  by	  one	  man	  –	  Putin	  –	  who	  does	  not	  have	  institutional	  barriers	  to	  his	  exercise	  of	  powers,	  and	  reportedly	  does	  not	  tolerate	  advice	  contrary	   to	   his	   inclinations.	   Two,	   Russia’s	   economy	   is	   deteriorating	   and	   thus,	   plans	  made	  today	  (especially	  for	  weapons	  acquisition)	  may	  have	  to	  be	  abandoned	  tomorrow.	  The	   latter	   scenario	  may	  open	  possibilities	   for	   further	   reductions	   of	   strategic	   nuclear	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weapons,	   although	   this	   would	   require	   a	   change	   in	   Putin’s	   well-­‐established	   negative	  attitude	   toward	   further	   U.S.–Russian	   bilateral	   strategic	   arms	   reductions	   and	   toward	  any	  discussion	  of	  NSNW	  reductions.	  	  It	   is	   helpful	   to	   emphasize	   an	   observation	   made	   during	   the	   Dialogue	   by	   one	   of	   the	  Russian	   participants,	   that	   Russia’s	   conduct	   in	   foreign	   affairs	   is	   deeply	   rooted	   in	   the	  nature	   of	   Putin’s	   regime,	   which	   has	   a	   shaky	   political	   foundation	   of	   corrupt	  bureaucracy,	   media	   manipulation,	   electoral	   fraud,	   repression	   and	   criminality.	  Mobilization	  of	  the	  public	  against	  the	  external	  enemy	  helps	  the	  regime,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  sky-­‐high	  approval	   ratings	   that	  Putin	   received	  after	   the	  annexation	  of	  Crimea	  and	  aggression	  against	  Ukraine,	  accompanied	  by	  frenzied	  anti-­‐American	  propaganda.	   It	   is	  also	   increasingly	   apparent	   that	   Putin	   himself	   shares	   the	   anti-­‐American	   sentiment	  prevalent	  today	  among	  the	  Russian	  public.	  Mobilizing	  public	  opinion	  against	  the	  United	  States	  has	  been	  far	  more	  beneficial	  for	  Putin	  than	  improved	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States	  were	   for	  his	  predecessor	  Boris	  Yeltsin.	  He	   is	  not	   likely	   to	  back	  away	   from	   the	  policy	   that	   helps	   him	   stay	   in	   power,	   requiring	   him	   to	   view	   the	   United	   States	   as	   an	  enemy	  and	  to	  treat	  every	  American	  policy	  initiative	  as	  a	  trap.	  	  Putin	   has	  made	   it	   clear	   that	   he	  will	   deal	  with	   the	  United	   States	   only	   after	   the	   latter	  changes	   major	   foreign	   policies	   such	   as	   democracy	   promotion,	   interventions	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  not	   approved	  by	  Russia	   in	   the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  missile	  defense,	   and	  support	  for	  sovereignty	  of	  former	  Soviet	  republics	  bordering	  Russia.	  Since	  the	  United	  States	   is	   unlikely	   to	   abandon	   these	   policies,	   it	   would	   not	   be	   in	   Putin’s	   character	   to	  change	  his	  stance.	  Even	  if	  the	  United	  States	  develops	  arms	  control	   initiatives	  that	  are	  not	  against	  Russian	  interests,	  Putin	  may	  react	  negatively	  just	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  “punish”	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Recommendations:	  What	  can	  we	  do	  in	  this	  difficult	  situation?	  	  
• Engage	   China	   in	   discrete	   discussions	   of	   strategic	   stability.	   This	   is	   bound	   to	  attract	  Russia’s	  attention	  and	  motivate	  Russia	  to	  engage	   in	  similar	  discussions	  with	  the	  United	  States.	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• As	  suggested	  by	  one	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  dialogue,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  discuss	   with	   Russia	   only	   those	   arms	   control	   issues	   the	   United	   States	   is	  interested	  in,	  thus	  excluding	  missile	  defense,	  prompt	  global	  strike,	  etc.	  	  
• Continue	  thinking	  and	  discussing	  how	  new	  capabilities	  in	  space,	  cyber	  warfare,	  precision	  strike	  and	  missile	  defense	  are	  related	  to	  our	  past	  concept	  of	  strategic	  stability,	  which	  developed	  from	  Cold	  War	  nuclear-­‐led	  thinking.	  	  
• Attempt	   a	   series	   of	   bilateral	   workshops,	   seminars	   and	   table-­‐top	   exercises	   on	  how	   our	   competing	   visions	   of	   doctrine	   and	   capabilities	   might	   play	   out	   in	   a	  confrontation	   or	   crisis	   where	   the	   use	   of	   force	   is	   a	   real	   possibility.	   Such	   a	  confrontation	   is	   unlikely	   but	   not	   impossible.	   For	   political	   reasons,	   these	  discussions	   cannot	   occur	   at	   the	   government	   level.	   They	   also	   cannot	   simply	  involve	  academic	  specialists,	  who	  may	  lack	  a	  visceral	  understanding	  of	  military	  behavior	   in	   crisis.	  We	   conclude	   that	   they	   should	  be	   conducted	   at	   the	  Track	   II	  level	  and	  involve	  heavy	  participation	  by	  retired	  senior	  military	  officers	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  
• Russia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  lack	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  act	  in	  the	  event	   of	   third	   party	   use	   of	   WMD.	   An	   especially	   dangerous	   scenario	   would	  involve	   an	   unattributed	   WMD	   attack	   against	   either	   nuclear	   superpower;	  Russia’s	  obsession	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  out	  to	  destroy	  Putin’s	  regime	  by	  any	  means	  could	  trigger	  catastrophic	  actions	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Russia.	  It	  would	   be	   beneficial	   to	   discuss	   a	   joint	   algorithm	   for	   reacting	   to	   such	   a	  development	   that	   would	   allow	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Russia	   to	   avoid	   a	   very	  dangerous	  crisis	  when	  third	  parties	  use	  WMD.	  	  	  	  
